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The Tradition Effect: Framing Honor Crimes in Turkey
An honor crime is commonly defi ned as the murder of a 
woman by members of her family who do not approve of her sexual 
behavior.1 While there are no offi cial statistics on the crime in Turkey, an 
incomplete collection of the cases that received coverage in the national 
media shows that in the three-year period between 1994 and 1996 a total 
of fi fty-three women fell victim to honor killings (see Yirmibesoglu).
Recently two events brought the issue to international public 
attention: the murder of Fadime Sahindal in Sweden by her father and 
the death sentence against Amina Lawal and its subsequent overturn in 
Nigeria. Sahindal was a member of the Kurdish minority in Sweden, where 
her family migrated from Turkey twenty years before her death. She was 
a vocal critic of honor crimes, bringing the issue to attention through her 
legal and public appearances. The series of court cases against Amina 
Lawal took place in the background of the divide between Christian and 
Muslim elements in Nigeria and the ensuing tensions between the federal 
and local juridical structures of the country.
Various actors, including the media, political parties, activ-
ist circles of various sorts, state institutions, and international bodies of 
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governance see honor crimes as primarily caused by tradition, alternately 
called “codes of honor,” or more broadly, “culture.”2 Yet, even the most 
superfi cial examination of such publicized cases as those of Ms. Lawal or 
Ms. Sahindal reveals that factors such as one’s ethnic identity as a minor-
ity, one’s activism, or one’s position in relation to state structures and 
contestations are integral to the perpetuation of honor crimes. In other 
words, honor crimes stand at the intersection of multiple political and 
social dynamics.
Clearly, this is an observation that applies not only to honor 
crimes but to most so-called traditional practices attributed to non-Western 
societies and to migrants from these societies. Indeed, the debate on honor 
crimes unfolds in dialogue with debates on other “problematic non-Western 
practices”3 such as female genital mutilation, sati,4 arranged marriages, 
and dowry murders. Feminists from third world countries, addressing 
fi rst world feminists in particular, have noted that to frame such practices 
as tradition is to ignore the structures of power and inequality at play.5 
Given the multiplicity and complexity of the institutions involved directly 
or indirectly with honor crimes, it is impossible to think of women in 
the third world as falling prey solely to traditional patriarchal structures. 
(See Lazreg, “Feminism,” Mani, Mohanty, Narayan, and Spivak.)
In contemporary Turkey honor crimes take place in the con-
text of the actions of such institutions as the Turkish state, the European 
Union, political parties of various sorts, national and transnational mar-
kets,6 national and international media, and feminist and human rights 
organizations. As I will show, what are defi ned as honor crimes and the 
ways of dealing with them are produced in relation to these institutional 
practices and discourses. That is why, following fellow third world femi-
nists, I argue that the analytical framework for examining honor crimes 
and other so-called traditional practices should shift from a focus on 
“tradition” or “culture” to an examination of the effects of various insti-
tutional structures.7
Third world feminist criticisms have been relatively well 
received in some Western feminist circles.8 The continuing dialogue 
among third world and fi rst world feminists about such so-called tradi-
tional practices is an extremely important achievement. Nevertheless, it 
is clear that arguments similar to the ones criticized by third world femi-
nists continue to be deployed by international institutions. Neither is the 
national political fi eld immune to the appropriation of arguments of “tra-
dition” in the making of gender inequality and violence against women. 
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In Turkey, for instance, an equally popular name for honor crimes is 
“crimes of tradition.”9 The prevalence of this discursive framework makes 
clear that the third world feminists’ critique is still relevant to both 
national and international power struggles.
If the so-called traditions are made and remade in relation to the 
actions of institutions, then the reduction and eventual extinction of honor 
crimes require targeted intervention on the part of the institutions. This 
necessitates an examination of institutions’ conduct and actions in local, 
national, and international sites of operation. Clearly, if none of the insti-
tutions were to play into the hands of these “traditions,” the crimes would 
still not instantly disappear. Yet I argue that institutional changes could go 
far to reduce the effects of these practices. Unfortunately, what happens on 
the ground is often quite the opposite: rather than working to diminish the 
force of “tradition,” institutions more often than not invoke it.
My argument here is analogous to Foucault’s in his analysis of 
the individual. He writes: “[I]t is already one of the prime effects of power 
that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires 
come to be identifi ed and constituted as individuals. The individual, that is, 
is not the vis-à-vis of power; [. . .] it is one of its prime effects” (98). As we 
know, Foucault does not argue that there are no individuals as acting living 
persons; nor does he deny that it is as individuals that many people come 
to think of themselves. His thinking is, rather, a call to critical refl ection 
on precisely the effects of the notion of the individual on the distribution 
of power in society. In a similar way, I do not mean to say that traditions 
do not exist, nor do I deny that people give meaning to their actions by 
evoking notions of tradition. I am simply arguing that every deployment 
of tradition has its effects in terms of the distribution of power.
By focusing on the ways in which this effect plays out in the 
discourses and practices of institutions, particularly through the dis-
tribution of institutional responsibility, I will show how, once tradition 
as such is invoked, the role of the institution in question fades into the 
background. This dynamic is visible in the case of those institutions that 
explicitly or implicitly bear a “modern” identity. When violence against 
women is framed as a matter of “tradition,” a distinction is established 
between, on the one hand, traditions—which are seen to be native, time-
less, and unchanging—and on the other, institutions—which appear as 
contemporary and timely. The utterance of “timeless tradition,” in other 
words, serves to produce its other, the modern, enlightened institution.
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A given institution may be chronically underfunded or ineffec-
tive, and it may not work in ways that are prescribed by law. Even when 
an institution operates legally or effi ciently, the undermining of women’s 
rights may be an integral part of its daily modus operandi or its ideologi-
cal structure. In other words, institutions, as themselves the products of 
political struggles with their own historical particularities, may not work 
in ways that are emancipatory for women. Nevertheless, almost by virtue of 
existing, they are imagined as “modern” and as working against tradition. 
Yet, once tradition is invoked, the complex picture in which honor crimes 
come to occur, including the involvement of the institution, is ignored. If 
honor crimes are seen as the result of tradition, then so-called modern 
institutions are imagined to stand outside of or in opposition to them.
Once this segmentation is achieved and tradition is properly 
blamed, there remains no necessity to inquire into the ways in which a 
particular institution may be implicated in the making of honor crimes. 
The gender policy of the institution, its daily practices and positions on 
particular issues, can remain unscrutinized. Such framing enables actors 
in social institutions to eschew responsibility for their own complicity.
This is not a matter of conscious planning or design. The 
institutions in question do not necessarily engage in a willful repression 
of women and then call it tradition. The effect is, rather, a matter of the 
discursive construction of the institutions and their practices. The manner 
of framing the issue delimits the universe of meaning through which it 
can be understood and the institutional mechanisms that can be produced 
(see Bourdieu, Logic). Traditions, especially traditions of the “other,” are 
considered static cultural features that are not easy to understand fully. 
These traditions are also presumed to be resistant to change. In this fram-
ing, there remain few viable options for the institution to pursue. In the 
face of such an impervious and inscrutable force, what one hears most 
often is a superfi cial re-citation of tradition as the root cause of honor 
crimes. Consequently, not much effort goes into examining the ways in 
which an institution’s own acts may be participating in the perpetuation 
of this allegedly timeless “tradition.” With the utterance of tradition, ques-
tions of violence against women and of the violation of their most basic 
rights fade away without being seriously addressed. This is what I call the 
tradition effect.10
The tradition effect prevails in multiple social domains; it 
appears in different guises and effectively enables the reproduction of 
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these very “traditions.” Yet, while the invoking of tradition stops self-
refl ection on the part of the institution, there is nonetheless signifi cant 
variation in the ways in which the tradition effect plays out. In other words, 
traditions are evoked in different ways by different institutions, depend-
ing on the political struggles involved and the discursive context within 
which they are implicated.
My aim here is to offer examples of this variation in the opera-
tion of different institutions in the context of Turkey. The state and 
judicial authorities that I examine reproduce the mainstream Turkish 
nationalist and statist view that honor crimes are traditions on their way 
to obsolescence thanks to the modernizing project of the nation-state. 
In this teleological framing, modernization will eventually put a stop to 
honor crimes in any case; therefore, they do not merit high priority. The 
governing Islamist Justice and Development Party denounces the violence 
while appropriating strong understandings of family and family honor in 
line with its own ideology of separate spheres. In the discourses of the 
European Union, the issue of honor crimes loses its urgency as a result of 
the lesser emphasis placed on gendered entitlements not readily framed by 
market imperatives and the so-called specifi c conditions of each country. 
Finally, the representations of honor crimes by the international media 
recycle and reproduce existing dichotomous understandings of “East” and 
“West” that presume essentialized identities in a hierarchical way.
In contemporary Turkey, the issue of honor crimes constitutes a 
fi eld in which multiple actors contest among themselves both the defi nition 
of the term and the measures that would eradicate it. Feminists of various 
sorts, national and international human rights activists, Kurdish parties 
and political groups, extreme nationalists, and national media are only 
some of the important actors engaged in these struggles; however, provid-
ing an exhaustive account of the fi eld by focusing on these actors and their 
struggles is beyond the scope of this paper. By naming the ways in which 
the tradition effect comes into play within a select group of institutions, I 
hope, rather, to suggest how one might begin to understand it.
Law and Other State Institutions
The criminal process of adjudicating honor crimes validates 
the “stain” a woman’s sexual acts allegedly bring to the family, a recogni-
tion that leads to substantial reductions in the punishment of perpetrators. 
Former Article 462 of the Turkish Criminal Code, for instance, deemed the 
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situation provocation if the perpetrator had discovered or was convinced 
that one of his fi rst-degree relatives involved in an illicit relationship. If 
the person then committed murder, the punishment could be reduced 
by one-eighth. This article was used often in combination with other 
articles, such as Article 51, which offers a second legal argument for leni-
ency. The latter holds that if a suspect has committed murder because of 
“uncontrollable grief” or as a result of provocation, the sentence may be 
reduced by two-thirds. The effect of the two articles together could result 
in substantially reduced sentences.
The problematic nature of these laws has been well publicized. 
Indeed, Article 462 was recently revoked as a result of Turkey’s efforts to 
gain accession to the European Union. Yet, as this paper goes to press, 
Article 51 and other problematic articles remain in effect. In today’s crimi-
nal code, concerns about family honor are, in fact, deemed so important 
that they can be shown to be a mitigating condition even of infanticide or 
the abandonment of a child. “Infanticide for family honor,” the legal term 
for a crime differentiated from manslaughter, draws a sentence of only four 
to eight years instead of the twenty-four to thirty years for “regular” man-
slaughter (Article 453). Likewise, according to Article 475 of the criminal 
code, if members of the “dishonored” family abandon an illegitimate child, 
the punishment is reduced to somewhere between one-sixth and one-third 
of the regular punishment for child abandonment. Such reductions are 
often combined with age reductions, leading to cases in which the fam-
ily of the victimized woman designates a younger member to commit the 
crime so as to benefi t from all possible legal mechanisms that can lessen 
the sentence. Clearly, then, legal texts in Turkey contribute in more than 
one way to the making of honor crimes by effectively rendering bearable 
the punishment of an honor crime.
Existing laws could be used to different ends in the adjudication 
of honor crimes. One alternative would be to use the same criminal code 
but apply other clauses, such as those regarding the ill treatment of minors, 
given that the women who are murdered are often minors. If the crime 
were conceived in this way, legal sanctions could be increased rather than 
reduced. Furthermore, in cases of honor crimes, it is almost always a family 
member who commits the murder of the woman or the violence against her. 
Legally, when an adult murders a woman, the penalty is increased if the 
victim is a minor and a family member. Yet, while these articles and oth-
ers point to alternative ways that existing laws could be applied, criminal 
judges and prosecutors almost never take up these alternatives.
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The value placed on family honor at the expense of women’s 
welfare is evident both in legal text and legal practice; it is not the prob-
lem of just a few problematic codes (see Sarihan). What we see here is a 
juridical convention, an established way of interpreting and applying laws 
that is reproduced through the social relations of legal professionals.11 As 
part of this convention, legal professionals select certain legal texts over 
others and deem some legal excuses more valid than others, though they 
certainly have choices. It is possible to see this convention at play in the 
daily operation of the law. The civil court judges I interviewed in the civil 
courts of a low-income district of Istanbul were, in fact, quite open about 
it.12 They saw family honor as a fundamental aspect of tradition, which was 
all the more interesting in that in the civil code, unlike the criminal code, 
there are fewer and far less signifi cant references to family honor.13 While 
these legal professionals found it “primitive” in content, they noted that it 
would take a great deal of time for Turkey to modernize and eventually do 
away with these traditions. In their view, honor crimes were the result of 
“an unlucky turn of tradition,” a case of “traditions getting out of hand.” 
They said they were certainly against the victimization of women in these 
cases, yet they sympathized with their colleagues in the criminal courts 
who routinely ordered reduced punishments for perpetrators of honor 
crimes. Civil court judges saw their colleagues as “appropriately” taking 
social norms into consideration when judging.
During my fi eldwork, I came across numerous instances of 
judges taking into account what can be called women’s “performance” 
of honor. This was most visible in divorce, alimony, and custody cases, 
in which it was common to see a judge and a court clerk discussing the 
woman’s dress and her and her opponent’s narratives in terms of unwrit-
ten criteria of honor. Women considered honorable would be treated more 
favorably in the trials, while there was no comparable consideration of 
men’s behavior. One judge’s response to my probing is illustrative:
No, we do not judge a woman’s honor here. Who are we to do 
that, after all? It is something personal. But, of course, when you 
are entrusting a minor to a woman, you want to make sure she 
has certain characteristics. For instance, it wouldn’t be appro-
priate to hand her the child if she sleeps around all the time. 
She has to behave in socially accepted ways, in line with what is 
customarily considered to be a good mother. Honor, after all, is 
a very important virtue. We cannot expect women to be without 
it. (Interview 2000)
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A comparison with another so-called tradition, “blood feud,” 
demonstrates the importance of gender in institutional attitudes towards 
crimes generated by “tradition.” Blood feud is an enmity between two 
families in which each family kills a male member of the rival family by 
turn. It entails concerns of family honor and the representation of the 
family in the public sphere. Unlike in honor killings, the victims here are 
almost without exception men. In the juridical handling of blood feud, 
there are no reductions due to the recognition of tradition. In fact, the 
law increases the penalty if a killing is seen to be the result of blood feud, 
which is to say, the law on the books interprets tradition contrary to the 
way it is interpreted in cases of honor killings. In legal practice as well, 
criminal judges and prosecutors routinely condemn the practice of blood 
feud and emphasize its total unacceptability (Sahin). When it is men or the 
masculine public order that seem to be threatened by practices deemed 
traditional, state institutions seem keen on eradicating the effect of tradi-
tion. When it comes to traditions that threaten the well-being of women, 
however, these “traditions” suddenly become resistant to change, and the 
law imagines itself as impotent to counter them.
The law is not the only state institution in which professionals 
dealing with honor crimes routinely take family honor into consideration 
even when they have other options. For instance, the State Institute of 
Statistics does not collect statistical data on honor crimes. The absence 
of reliable data in turn makes the topic vulnerable to speculation and 
opens the door to the blaming of tradition. The prevalent use of virgin-
ity exams, performed by state hospitals at the request of families, is also 
problematic (see Parla). (These exams are generally performed in order 
to determine whether or not the woman or girl in question has had sexual 
intercourse.) Commonly forced on minors by their families, the exams 
have an immense effect on the girls who experience them. The feelings 
of shame and humiliation evoked are often precisely what the families 
want their daughters to feel.14 Journalists and human rights and women’s 
rights advocates have noted that police forces routinely side with members 
of the family in such cases.15
The picture gets even bleaker when we consider the limited 
recourse available to women who are victimized due to reasons of honor. 
Suffi ce it to say that in modern-day Turkey, with a population of seventy 
million, there are a total of eight women’s shelters and no twenty-four-
hour hotlines for any form of violence against women. In such a context, it 
is striking that instead of focusing on institutions and their role in honor 
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crimes, the bearers of these institutions end up blaming a tradition that 
is deemed too strong to be dissolved.
This framing of honor killings as stemming from tradition 
seems to contradict the ways state institutions are imagined in Turkey, 
where modernization is seen as a complete civilizational shift from the 
Ottoman Empire’s “backward” and “traditional” social order to one that is 
“modern” and “Western” (see Ahmad and Zurcher). As a result of this shift, 
Turkey is to have become the only country with a predominantly Muslim 
population that has entirely embraced secularism in its legal and institu-
tional framework. Such a view imagines Turkey’s institutions as antitheti-
cal to tradition. Why, then, do institutional practices that are otherwise 
legitimized through their confrontation with tradition stop at the door of 
honor killings? Why, when it comes to honor killings, does the Turkish 
Republican contraposition of institution and tradition break down?
An answer to this question can be found in the ways in which 
the politics of gender have played out in the constitution of political and 
institutional realms. Chatterjee points to a dilemma shared by nationalist 
movements in a number of non-Western contexts. On the one hand, the 
nation must be unique in its realization of its own essence. On the other, 
it must appropriate Western modernity, which in effect means changing 
and becoming like the West. How can the non-Western nation be both 
unique and like the West? Chatterjee notes that this is the question that 
has lain at the heart of many of the movements and projects of non-West-
ern nationalism.
In the Republican era that started in the 1920s, a narrative 
asserting the similarity of “ancient Turkish ways” to Western modernity 
became the hegemonic way of resolving this dilemma. That is, the “Turk-
ish groups” that lived in Central Asia before their migration to Anatolia 
and before conversion to Islam (third century bc to ninth century ad) were 
taken to be the ancestral communities of the nation, and these groups 
were thought of as having lived in ways very similar to contemporary 
Europeans. Democracy and gender equality, traits taken to characterize 
the “West,” were also seen as characterizing the life of these ancestral 
Turks.16 Westernization, then, was not something alien to Turks, but was, 
rather, a return to their original national roots and national essence. The 
Republic tried to dissolve Islamic and traditional identities by alluding to 
a tradition that was allegedly much older and supposedly more essentially 
“Turkish.” In other words, the Republican elite resolved the dilemma of 
non-Western nationalism by positing that there was no such dilemma. 
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Any trait that was perceived as “Western” and/or “modern” was actually 
always already Turkish.
Women’s rights and the constitution of the gender regime of 
the Republic took place in this historical context. The 1930s saw women 
gaining suffrage and other legal rights, such as the right to inheritance 
and to education. However—and this is crucial—the prevailing concep-
tion was that these rights were “grants to women” by the state as the 
conditions for modernity and for the well-being of the nation. The legal 
rights that promised substantial improvements in women’s lives thus 
went hand in hand with the disbanding of the women’s movements that 
had demanded those rights (see Zihnioglu and Sirman, “Feminism”). 
The state was neither to negotiate these rights with women nor to deliver 
them in response to demand. Women’s rights and reforms towards gender 
equality were, rather, a primary way of exerting a new national identity 
that was in opposition to the Ottoman Empire and its Islamic identity (see 
Kandiyoti, Sirman, “Gender,” and Tekeli). The unveiled, educated, and 
“modern” woman of the Republic was the marker of this transition from 
an imagined “backwards” and “traditional” past to a fresh and “modern” 
future (Gole). Women were supposed to be grateful for this change and for 
the rights they gained. They were to work for the good of the nation and 
family, the two entities often posited interchangeably in the hegemonic 
discourses of the Republic at the time. Women’s rights or the presence of 
women in the public sphere, then, did not challenge the fact that women’s 
roles were defi ned primarily with reference to the family.
What the Republican era did transform was the way in which 
the family related to the gendered public sphere. In the last century of the 
Empire, those who could speak in the name of a large household were the 
ones who could take on the task of political representation in the public 
sphere. The eldest and most powerful man of the family would repre-
sent the elite households made up of the nuclear family, members of the 
extended family such as cousins and grandparents, as well as slaves, and 
servants (see Peirce and Sirman, “Gender” and “State”). The Republican 
regime, itself growing as a reaction to this social order, offered a promise 
and a window of opportunity for young men (see Mardin, Genesis and 
“Power”). In the new regime, not only old and elite men but all men could 
become part of a constitutive public. In order to be recognized as equal 
participants in the public sphere, they needed only to perform military 
service and to establish a nuclear household. Thus, the young Republic 
underwent a transformation from a masculine public made up of heads of 
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big households to another masculine public comprised of heads of nuclear 
families. The importance of family as the unit of representation continued, 
and the task of representation continued to be seen as primarily a task of 
men (see Saktanber and Sirman, “Gender” and “State”). Women in this 
social order were to assist the men and take care of the family. Regardless 
of their successes in the newfound public life, they continued to be defi ned 
mainly by—and they themselves defi ned their identities in relation to—the 
family (Durakbasa).
Institutions in Turkey today are marked by this hegemonic 
way of resolving the dilemma of third world nationalism and the ensu-
ing gender politics. Family continues to be the construct through which 
women are defi ned, while men can claim more space in asserting their 
entitlements as individuals. Women’s presence in the public sphere, an 
important symbolic marker of the “modernity” of the Republic, did not 
quite translate into empowerment in their daily lives as individuals inde-
pendent of the family. Consequently, women’s honor is perceived as bound 
by family honor. Social and institutional formations in Turkey presume 
men to be in charge of the family, and women’s honor is determined by 
men’s actions in the public sphere that refl ect the honor of the family.
The Republic, then, bears remarkable historical continuity with 
the Ottoman era in terms of the centrality of the family both to public life 
and to the defi nition of women’s social roles. In the framework deployed by 
most civil servants, however, this historical continuity and the gendered 
nature of the Republican public sphere is erased from the picture. Women’s 
legal rights in Republican legal texts are compared favorably with the fl at 
representations of other Middle Eastern countries or with the supposed 
lack of power of women in the Ottoman era.17 Honor crimes and the legal 
responses to them are seen as exceptional moments in which tradition 
fi nds its way into state institutions. The modernizing elements of the state 
that have granted women’s rights will “eventually” tackle the issue, since 
full gender equality is seen as the sine qua non of modernization. In the 
meantime, women should appreciate the rights they have and the value of 
the modernizing Republic. Women have “simply” to be patient.
The tradition effect here works to increase the amount of time 
deemed necessary for institutions to eliminate honor crimes. The “future” 
of modernization becomes the main reason that existing traditions must be 
endured and even accommodated. This constant reiteration of the future 
means de facto that women’s rights cannot become a priority arena for 
an agenda of social change that is meaningful to their lives. It also works 
d i f f e r e n c e s 129
to render invisible the complicity of state institutions and the juridical 
apparatus in furthering the conditions that give rise to honor crimes. 
In fact, the more a modernizing egalitarian narrative is disseminated 
while not being realized, and the more the mechanisms through which 
state institutions contribute to the perpetuation of honor crimes fail to be 
accounted for, the more honor crimes become “traditions” that somehow (!) 
fi nd their way back into the lives of women.
The Justice and Development Party
The Justice and Development Party (jdp) came to power in 
November 2002 as the fi rst noncoalition government in Turkey in the last 
two decades. Its political idiom follows the line of prior populist-Islamist 
parties dissolved in the last three decades of the Republic. Yet it stands 
apart from them in its embrace of the secular framework and of what are 
deemed “Western” institutional structures such as the European Union.
The party’s program devotes a signifi cant amount of attention 
to women’s concerns. It includes a discussion of national and international 
remedies such as the use of the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (cedaw). Honor crimes are also specifi cally 
addressed in the program in the following way: “[I]n places where wom-
en’s suicides, murders of tradition and of honor are seen in abundance, 
the party will organize preventive and educational programs targeting 
women and their families.” In this framing, honor crimes are collapsed 
into women’s suicides. Unusually high rates of suicide among young people 
are a rather recent phenomenon. The reasons for such suicides—their 
potential links to pressures having to do with family honor, to the effects 
of the armed confl ict between Kurdish guerillas and the Turkish army, or 
to the economic situation—have not been suffi ciently explored.
The single clear fact about the suicides is their location: south-
eastern Turkey. Since honor killings are thought to be most prevalent in 
the Southeast, the jdp collapses the two. In this way, the party contributes 
to the mainstream view that honor crimes are a phenomenon contained 
in the Southeast, a view held by people of various political orientations. 
In the absence of national and regional statistics about honor crimes, it is 
diffi cult to assess this assumption, although media reports in other parts 
of the country make it seem hardly realistic. And even if killings per se are 
more prevalent in the Southeast, other practices that can be placed under 
the rubric of honor crimes, such as the limits imposed on women’s rights 
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to travel or to receive education,18 and other forms of violence women face 
in the name of the protection of honor, are fairly commonplace even in 
cosmopolitan centers such as Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir.
To single out the Southeast implies that honor crimes are 
primarily a Kurdish phenomenon, as the area is populated primarily by 
Kurds. Such a portrayal amounts to the stigmatization of Kurds, a process 
that is already very much under way due to past armed confl icts between 
the Kurdish guerilla forces and the Turkish military, with the ensuing 
forced migration and poverty of Kurds. Here we see the ethnicization of 
the tradition effect: honor crimes attributed to the traditions of an already 
disadvantaged ethnic group and its region. This enables other parts of the 
country to be imagined as somehow immune to the problem.
The solutions the jdp offers to the problem of honor crimes are 
equally problematic. Education programs that target primarily women 
and their families are offered, and yet the content of these educational 
programs remains unclear. As mentioned, such institutional remedies 
as shelters or hotlines that help protect women from honor crimes and 
other types of violence are extremely few or altogether absent. In such a 
context, education, no matter what the content, is clearly insuffi cient to 
curtail crimes of honor. Moreover, the idea of providing such an educa-
tion to women together with their families is problematic in that family 
members are the perpetrators or potential perpetrators of the crimes. In 
such an educational atmosphere, women, or at least less powerful women 
who are at risk of being victimized due to reasons of family honor, will 
not be able to make their concerns heard.
The jdp’s political emphasis on family thoroughly informs the 
party’s stance and policies with regard to women’s issues, which are com-
monly subsumed under the rubric of family and the roles of women in it. 
The introductory statement of the section called “Woman” in the party’s 
program is illustrative: “Women are not only important because they 
make up half of our population, but they are the most important because 
as individuals they are primarily responsible for the rearing of healthy 
generations.” Family is seen as the building block, the foundational unit, 
of society. Women’s individuality is conceptualized as the enabling feature 
of the social order as it is meant to sustain this foundation.
Actions of the jdp on gender issues in general and honor crimes 
in particular refl ect a line that follows the party program. In August 2003, 
the parliament, dominated by the party’s representatives, passed a package 
of laws and legal arrangements for purposes of admission to the European 
d i f f e r e n c e s 131
Union. Article 462 of the criminal code was cancelled as part of this pack-
age. As mentioned above, this was one of the problematic articles central 
to the adjudication of honor crimes, reducing penalties for perpetrators 
by putting family members’ concerns under the legal category of provo-
cation. The cancellation was a most welcome development for advocates 
of women’s rights who had spent considerable effort on this annulment. 
Yet, again, the problems with the legal handling of honor crimes were not 
limited to this article and therefore not solved by this single legislative act. 
Not only is there more than one problematic clause but there remains in 
place a convention of juridical interpretation of honor crimes that allows 
judges to pick out and apply certain clauses at the expense of others.
At the time of the revocation of Article 462, feminists in Turkey 
who had for a long time voiced their critique of the existing criminal code 
were anticipating the drafting of a new law expected to address problems 
of gender equality and to effect the development of new and egalitarian 
juridical conventions. Immediately before the passage of the e.u. package 
of laws, the jdp delivered a bitter blow to these expectations by revealing 
its plan for the reform of the criminal code. To the grave disappointment of 
women’s rights advocates, the proposed code was in many ways even more 
problematic than the existing code. The draft law, for instance, reinstalls 
the provocation clause that can be interpreted to legitimize honor killings, 
that is, it is the equivalent of the infamous Article 462 that was revoked 
by the jdp. Penalty reduction for infanticide in the case of children born 
out of wedlock remains in place, and moreover, in the case of rape, if the 
rapist marries the woman, he can be released from punishment.19
Although the jdp does give in to political pressure, especially 
where admission to the e.u. is concerned, in the larger picture its form of 
gender politics is still shaped by a particular version of family ideology. 
At times the nature of honor crimes becomes acutely clear, and it is then 
that the crimes are projected onto the Kurdish population and southeast-
ern region, as if the problem could be contained, kept out of the reach of 
national politics. At other times, when elements of honor crimes can be 
more easily accommodated by accepted notions of tradition, the familial 
aspects are highlighted at the expense of the criminal acts.
Audiences located outside Turkey often perceive the jdp as 
a group of fundamentalists whose attitudes towards women and family 
honor refl ect the fl at and unforgiving traditionalism of Islamist extrem-
ism. Examining the jdp’s actions yields a different view. The jdp advocates 
admission to the European Union and quite seriously addresses human 
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rights and bureaucratic reform issues that had gone relatively untouched 
in prior governments. In the Turkish political spectrum, it aims to become 
a party of the right-wing center. The party’s efforts over the course of the 
last year to redefi ne its identity as “conservative democrat” also refl ect 
this stance.
The key to the party’s gender politics and its position on honor 
crimes can be found not in its alleged fundamentalism, but in the alterna-
tive resolution it attempts to bring to the dilemma of third world nation-
alism. The party’s stance on this key issue is signifi cantly different from 
the hegemonic position disseminated by the state institutions discussed 
earlier. Here, it has to be remembered that the Republican People’s Party, 
the single opposition party in parliament, gives political voice to the natu-
ralized dispositions of actors in legal and other state institutions.
The jdp resolves the dilemma of third world nationalism in a 
way similar to Indian nationalists of the nineteenth century as described 
by Chatterjee: by separating spheres of life into binaries such as home 
versus public, spiritual versus material. These dichotomies came to be 
superimposed on each other and then aligned with gender difference. 
Thus, while women came to represent home and the spiritual domain of 
Indian life, men came to represent the material and the public. This meant 
that as long as women reserved what was essentially Indian, by represent-
ing spirituality and staying within the boundaries of the domestic sphere, 
men could go ahead and embrace Western civilization.
Unlike the total and relentless acceptance of all things Western 
and “modern” by the Republicans, the jdp, like the Indian nationalists, 
conceives of separate and gendered spheres of social life. The domestic 
domain and women are seen as repositories of tradition and the bearers 
of the essence of Muslim Turkishness. The public sphere is once again 
perceived as male by the jdp, but in a different way, for it is there that 
Westernization is to take place, and men, by virtue of not being primar-
ily responsible for the domestic sphere, are seen as the principal public 
actors. Moreover, the two domains are seen as complementary. Protection 
of the home and the family is what enables Westernization and economic 
development. For modernization and economic development to be suc-
cessful, the family, as women’s “traditional” sphere and thereby the locus 
of national/cultural essence, must be protected. The jdp’s efforts to fi nd 
solutions to women’s problems in general and honor crimes in particular 
by asserting the centrality of the family are meant to secure the home part 
of the equation of national development.
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In this way, the tradition effect enables the Justice and Devel-
opment Party to resolve a basic tension. On the one hand, it is the most 
open Islamist party so far to embrace a certain set of democratic freedoms, 
human rights, and secular institutions. On the other, it has an electoral 
base that requires the protection of some fundamental Turkish and Islamic 
traits. A relatively risk-free way to strike a balance between these two 
tensions comes in the form of preserving traditions, especially when they 
revolve around such a central tenet of the jdp as “family.” This enables 
the positing of cultural difference from the West and secures the identity 
of the Turkish Muslim electoral base. Such a cultural difference is all the 
more signifi cant at present as the party strives to gain accession for Turkey 
into the e.u. Simultaneously, this kind of a “differentiated” approach to 
Westernization and modernization allows the jdp to distinguish itself from 
the Republican People’s Party, its primary rival and the main opposition 
party in parliament.20
The European Union
Since 1999, Turkey has been a candidate for admission into 
the European Union. The Union set the start of offi cial negotiations for 
admission conditional upon Turkey’s meeting a set of economic, social, and 
political criteria.21 In other words, for the “beginning of the beginning” 
of membership, Turkey has to establish that it has a stable institutional 
environment guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and 
respect for and protection of minorities. These have necessitated a number 
of signifi cant reforms in the country’s political and institutional context. 
Turkey’s overall performance in meeting these requirements has been 
considered signifi cant but insuffi cient. As a result, its process of negotia-
tion currently lags behind the other twelve candidate countries, most of 
which have passed this stage and are in the process of initiating their full 
membership. At the moment, Turkey is scheduled for an overall evaluation 
in 2004. Whether and, if so, how Turkey’s negotiations for membership 
will begin depends on this evaluation.
In Turkey there is a general expectation that admission to 
the European Union will boost the economy and be a major step in the 
realization of long awaited social and institutional changes such as the 
consolidation of civil society, democracy, and the rule of law. While most 
political and professional sectors support these developments, there are 
also serious differences within and among each of these groups. As in 
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other candidate countries, membership in the European Union and the 
ensuing reviews is a process that cross-cuts the interests of different pro-
fessional groups like the army and the government bureaucracy, as well 
as affecting the interests of the bourgeoisie and different political groups 
such as those of the nationalists, the Islamists, and so on. These different 
sets of interests are intimately tied to the admission process, sometimes 
for and sometimes against. Thus, the process of admission into the e.u. 
has immense effects on the political atmosphere in Turkey as it stands at 
the center of multiple political contentions.22
In the midst of these struggles for political power, the e.u. has 
nonetheless consistently been an important force for social and insti-
tutional reform in the last decade. According to a recent Human Rights 
Watch report, “The process of Turkey’s accession to the e.u. has, since 
1999, emerged as the most important catalyst of reform in Turkey” (Human 
Rights Agenda). An issue gets accelerated attention from government offi -
cials, media, and other social sectors when it is put on the agenda of admis-
sion into the e.u. Honor crimes are generally placed under the heading of 
economic, social and cultural rights within the section on human rights 
and the protection of minority rights.23 As such, they are placed within the 
set of mid-range requirements for Turkey’s accession.
One way that Turkey has been dealing with demands for 
reforms has been to prepare legislative packages that make changes to 
several laws at once. Since February 2002, seven such packages have been 
legislated by Parliament. The famous Article 462 was revoked as part of 
the sixth of these packages. Indeed, in the last few years the issue gained 
increased attention in negotiations of feminists and the e.u. with the 
Turkish government, which has facilitated the process of raising aware-
ness about honor crimes and creating policies about it. The negotiating 
process can be said to have given women’s rights advocates leverage in 
their lobbying efforts.
This, however, is not to deny the fact that the general repre-
sentation of honor crimes by the Union is rather fl at, and the institutional 
and political capacity of the e.u. to curtail the crimes is far from realized. 
A more expansive approach could easily formulate honor crimes at the 
intersection of civil and political rights or at the intersection of the rule 
of law and democracy. Were honor crimes to be implicated in terms of 
civil, political, social, and economic rights, they could be moved from the 
category of mid-range to short-range issues in Turkey’s e.u. admission 
timetable.
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As the main elected body of the European Union, the Parliament 
is the organ that generally takes positions by way of preparing reports on 
issues like honor crimes. These, then, are refl ected in the policies adopted 
towards relevant countries by the executive branch, the European Com-
mission. This process involves an assessment of the specifi c circumstances 
of a country, with its strengths and its problems, followed by the establish-
ment of criteria and priorities for change in line with this assessment. The 
European Commission then periodically examines the given country’s 
progress and prepares reports about the required transformations.
The Parliament works through a number of committees. In the 
case of honor crimes, the relevant committee would be the Committee 
on Women’s Rights and Equal Opportunities. Yet, to this day, the Parlia-
mentary Commission has not prepared a report or a resolution on honor 
crimes.24 Without such a resolution, the issue gets less attention in the 
European Commission. Consequently, the issue of honor crimes is listed 
in the progress reports as just another problematic item among Turkey’s 
political and human rights issues.25 Within this framing, the issues of 
courthouse practice discussed above are not addressed at all, and the 
numerous legal issues are reduced to just a few. The juridical convention 
that often defi nes women primarily with regard to family goes unnoticed. 
Even the problematic nature of the drafted criminal code or the fact that it 
reinscribes the offensive former laws is not adequately addressed. Without 
suffi cient attention to these dynamics, honor crimes are ultimately sub-
sumed under the rubric of entrenched traditions.
This oversight can be understood in the context in which the 
European Union imagines itself and produces its policies. Indeed, it is 
fruitful here to emphasize the fact that the European Union itself is very 
much in the process of formation and transformation. Not only its fi ne 
points but certain key aspects of its governance—such as the weight to be 
given to national jurisdictions in different matters, commonly known as 
subsidiarity, and the place of religion in the Union’s political organiza-
tion—are being contested, as is clear in the process involved in the drafting 
of the e.u. Constitution. The progress of candidate countries is, therefore, 
not only a function of domestic dynamics but also of their dialogical rela-
tion to the formative dynamics within the Union.
Integration of new member states into the European Union 
is framed by reference to the economic sphere; that is, market ideas 
and practices form the basic framework of e.u. institutionalization and 
legitimation (see Gilbert, McCormick, and Hayward and Page). As one area 
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of integrated policy-making in the Union, gender both enjoys and suffers 
from the framework that posits the market as the main element of Euro-
pean integration. Without downplaying the impact of feminist struggles for 
reform in market-based areas, we can still say that priority is usually given 
to those areas of gender policy that are crucial for market imperatives. 
For instance, equal participation in the labor market and social security, 
both of which are closely related to the regulation and restructuration 
of markets across Europe, have thus far been the two main areas of the 
e.u.’s gender policy-making. In a related vein, equal opportunity between 
women and men—an issue compatible with market-based thinking—has 
emerged as a defi nite precondition for the accession of candidate coun-
tries (see Rees).
Concerns about gender equality that are not easily framed 
within the market paradigm, however, are marginalized. As they are 
harder to accommodate within the policy framework of the Union, they are 
not only rendered tangential to the mainstream of e.u. politics, they also 
fail to appear on the list of short-term priorities for accession of candidate 
countries. Issues of this kind are often left to the national jurisdictions of 
individual countries (see Hoskyns). Honor crimes—probably due to their 
serious nature—are not entirely left to the jurisdiction of the national 
authority. However, because of the diffi culty of translating them into the 
market paradigm, the approach to them is generally timid and low-key.
The principle of “gender mainstreaming” in e.u. policy-making 
is something that also affects the development of measures to curtail 
honor crimes (see Mazey). In its Communication of 1996, the Commission 
defi nes gender mainstreaming as “mobilizing all general policies and 
measures specifi cally for the purpose of achieving equality by actively and 
openly taking into account at the planning stage their possible effects on 
the respective situations of men and women.”26 Examples of such main-
streaming can be found in the e.u. Parliament in such issues as “Mobilizing 
Women to Enrich European Research” or “Gender Budgeting: Building 
Public Budgets from a Gender Perspective.” Programs that give women an 
advantage over men—in ways comparable to affi rmative action measures 
in the u.s.—are now to be coupled with those that bring gender concerns 
to the mainstream. The “double approach” is the goal of current policy-
making and implementation.
This double approach is the product of decades of feminist work 
in the countries of the European Union to ensure that issues of gender 
are no longer ghettoized. Gender issues are now seen to involve the social 
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domain as a whole and for this reason to require institutional and social 
restructuration. However—and this is the double-edged nature of the 
feminist achievement—the success in institutionalizing at least some of 
the former concerns means that the emphasis now falls strongly on gen-
der mainstreaming. In the context of Turkey, given the abovementioned 
insuffi ciency of institutional resources and mechanisms to combat vio-
lence against women, the most basic changes to institutional structures 
could make a difference. That is, the issue of honor crimes as it currently 
stands lands squarely in the arena of specifi c projects targeting women, 
which lie in the opposite direction of gender mainstreaming. Due to these 
dynamics, the problem of honor crimes falls out of sync with the dominant 
trend in e.u. policy-making and enforcement.
The particular ways in which the e.u. imagines itself as pri-
marily a community of markets and the particular dynamics of its gender 
policies thus affect the ways it deploys its institutional resources to cur-
tail honor crimes. Through these policies of less than full engagement, 
honor crimes end up falling from the agenda of serious short-term reform. 
Clearly, the arena of short-term issues is where the e.u. confronts Turk-
ish authorities most seriously and directly about the complicity of state 
institutions in the perpetuation of practices deemed unacceptable to the 
e.u. Unfortunately, it is precisely there that honor crimes fail to appear. 
This failure amounts to the relegation of these crimes, their reasons, and 
their effects to an inscrutable and impervious tradition.
International News Media
The coverage of honor crimes by the international news media 
offers another perspective on the way the tradition effect operates. The 
reporting of Semse Allak’s case is a good example. Ms. Allak was the object 
of much press attention as she lay in a coma after being stoned by her fam-
ily. A recent New York Times article on her death noted:
Much of Semse Allak’s story has been lost in a whirl of confl icting 
versions of her death. By most accounts, Allak fell victim to the 
age-old honor code that survives in the villages of Southeastern 
Turkey, a system so unforgiving that some villagers said they 
were relieved to learn of Allak’s death. If she had survived the 
villagers said the family of the man who had been killed with 
her would have been obliged to take revenge on Allak’s family, 
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since it was Allak’s brother who was suspected of his murder. 
(Filkins)
Here, the author posits the “age-old honor code” as the reason for Ms. 
Allak’s death and goes on to connect the question of this death with the 
annulment of Article 462 discussed above. He frames the death, then, as 
integral to the matter of assessing Turkey’s “civilizational status”: “The 
legislation was part of a broader effort to secure Turkey’s long-hoped-for 
admission to the European Union and, more profoundly, to answer the 
centuries-old question of Turkey’s place in the world: whether in Europe 
or in the Middle East.”
Later in the article, a historical dimension is added to this oppo-
sitional pairing of Europe and the Middle East: the practice is defi ned as 
“medieval.” The “age-old honor code” is what makes Turkey medieval, and 
Turkey has to make a choice between these geographical and historical 
positions. In other words, the problem of honor crimes is displaced from 
the question of women’s rights or from matters of policy onto the matter 
of Turkey’s placement in an imagined comparison of civilizations. Such 
dichotomies collapsing time and space in an orientalist fashion are com-
mon in media portrayals of honor crimes. They posit an essential “East” 
and “West,” “Middle East” and “Europe,” past and present, tradition and 
modernity (see Said). “East,” “past,” and “tradition” are collapsed into 
each other only to be opposed to a union of “West,” present, and moder-
nity. The result is a dramatic picture in which primordial forces are pitted 
against each other, and all local, national, and international complexities 
are rendered invisible.27
Another theme of the international news media is the anxiety 
over the transplantation of honor crimes into areas that are not its “native 
habitat.” Here, it is Europe or the “West” at large that must be protected 
from such onerous traditions. News headlines such as “Young Kurd’s 
Murder Shocks Sweden” abound (bbc 26 Jan. 2002). A Washington Post 
article reads:
People put their tradition into their luggage, along with their pil-
lows and sheets, says Mehmet Farac, who wrote a book on honor 
crimes in Turkey and has conducted some defi nitive research 
on the subject. Therefore they cannot break their ties with their 
society and traditions. Sometimes a girl wearing jeans or lip-
stick, combing her hair, or the way she looks in a mirror can 
make the family uncomfortable. (Moore)
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It is as if a healthy Western civilization runs the risk of contagion by these 
crimes—infection brought in with pillows and sheets (see Douglas).
Such reporting seems to parallel the national view of the issue 
as contained in the Southeast. Honor crimes are imagined as the sudden 
eruption of the traditional, the past, and the problematic East where they 
are not supposed to appear. This in turn works to reconstitute the intact 
European and/or “Western self,” depending on the ways in which the 
dichotomies are aligned.28
The tradition effect and the ensuing dichotomies enable the 
media to address their audiences in a more dramatic way (see Soothill and 
Walby, and Signorelli and Morgan). Political and institutional issues are 
transformed into moral and/or identitarian dualities. Moreover, chronicles 
of deaths foretold by victims themselves—such as Fadime Sahindal, who 
was murdered in Sweden after her activism on the issue—offer more stir-
ring reading than the issues as raised by the activists when they were 
alive. The larger question honor crimes pose to Sweden or England and 
the European Union at large, about the institutional ways immigrants are 
incorporated into national markets and polities, remains underexplored.
Finally, the tradition effect seems to posit the unity of Europe or 
the “West.” Pointing out the problems of the “other” enables the Western 
self to be seen as immune to such problems as violence against women in 
the name of family. At a time when local, national, and global forces are 
intermingling and the struggles to consolidate the European Union are 
ongoing, the allusion to tradition becomes one way that “Europe” can be 
imagined through what it is not.
In this way, the international news media practice a mode of 
representation that is comfortable for the reader; the issue is made to seem 
comfortably exotic, having nothing to do with the reader’s experiences in 
and of institutions. The appeal of the news item on honor crimes is that of 
cultural difference in which difference bears the mark of violence. The 
reader can then have voyeuristic access to a sexualized violence and at the 
same time enjoy the ensuing feeling of moral and cultural superiority.
Conclusions
While tradition is the shared reference point in institutional 
discourses that address honor crimes, the ultimate vagueness of this 
reference is signifi cant. Whether in party programs, legal arguments, or 
newspaper articles, central questions about the nature of these traditions 
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remain unanswered. For instance, under what circumstances does the 
killing of a woman become an honor crime? If it is the cultural practice 
of killing women who engage in unapproved sexual acts, what constitutes 
such an act? What are the crime’s relationships to other traditions? What 
exactly is the source or the location of this tradition? Is it a tradition based 
on ethnicity or nationality? Is it Turkish, Kurdish, Iraqi, Pakistani? Is it part 
of religious identity, that is, is it an Islamic phenomenon? Is it a tradition 
specifi c to a region such as the Middle East or the Mediterranean? None 
of the institutional discourses examined so far give concrete answers 
to these questions. Such a degree of indeterminacy regarding an issue 
that affects so many women’s lives is signifi cant. Arguably, a comparable 
indeterminacy would be considered intolerable by political or legal insti-
tutions should the question have to do with something like state security 
or disaster management.
I argue that this elusiveness when it comes to understanding 
the “tradition” of honor crimes cannot be reduced to an inability to gather 
information but has to be understood in light of the ways in which the 
tradition effect plays out. As mentioned earlier, the gesture of declaring 
an arbitrary line between the institution and tradition is common to all 
institutional discourses; the operations of the institutions are seen to be 
independent of the mechanisms of tradition and immune to their impact. 
The institution thus sees itself as outside tradition. In this way, clarity 
and transparency are on the side of the institution, and murkiness and 
imprecision are projected onto the tradition part of the binary.
As I have tried to show, this discursive dynamic unfolds in 
several institutions simultaneously. In other words, tradition is seen to be 
external to the activities of, at once, political parties,29 judicial authori-
ties, the European Union, and the international media, as well as to such 
structures as national and international markets. When a putatively sin-
gular domain of life—tradition—comes to be seen as external to so many 
different institutions, an interesting picture emerges. While tradition 
continues to be conceived in the singular, it nonetheless comes to signify 
multiple things at once. For instance, the signifi cation of tradition by the 
international news media operates through the seemingly timeless bina-
ries of East/West or past/present, while the discourse of Turkish judicial 
authorities situates tradition as the source of an ultimately temporary 
resistance to modernization. The two discourses overlap, of course, but 
work with very different assumptions in the end.
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Tradition thus comes to be entangled in the different opposi-
tions that institutions produce along with their institutional politics. As 
such, each institutional discourse evokes different meanings with the 
term, and when multiple institutions produce knowledge about relatively 
different processes under the same rubric, the net result is a somewhat 
elusive body of knowledge. However, this elusiveness is not seen as an 
effect of the knowledge production process, itself lying at the heart of 
multiple political contentions. Instead, it is projected back onto the cat-
egory of tradition. Tradition becomes this “thing” that is inherently hard 
to pin down.
Clearly, no single object of discourse, whether honor crimes, 
state security, or disaster management, lies “naturally” within the reach 
of the institution nor outside its reach. The assignment of these two differ-
ent modes of knowing is inherently political. And yet, the political nature 
of the assignment of “inside” and “outside” is itself neither singular nor 
stable, but a matter of relations of power.
The only ray of light in this picture is that changes in the topog-
raphy of these political relations can bring about changes in the perception 
of honor crimes. In fact, the tradition effect does lose its appeal once real-
life actors with interests are identifi ed, once politically motivated poli-
cies become the subject of debate, that is to say, once the power relations 
entailed in the handling of honor crimes are identifi ed and demystifi ed.
This, however, is not to celebrate institutionalized discourses 
nor to call for the production of more specifi c institutionalized knowl-
edge on honor crimes. Incitement to discourse as expertise, eloquently 
described by Foucault, may not be the way to counteract the tradition effect. 
In other words, World Bank reports on honor crimes or academic critiques 
of “problematic third world traditions” may be equally ineffective in tack-
ling honor crimes. These expert discourses, while producing knowledge, 
may well come up with institutionalized binaries of their own.
To address honor crimes from the perspective of women’s rights 
and well-being, it seems that a third way out of the grim choice between 
the tradition effect and the disciplinary effect is needed. This alternative 
discourse must be attentive to the many forms of knowledge about honor 
crimes and to the relationship between these forms of knowledge and 
different kinds of power relations. It must make visible the ways in which 
honor crimes come to be formulated by different institutions in line with 
their particular agendas. And it needs to develop alternative agendas that 
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prioritize the concerns of women themselves. This clearly means a dis-
course that is simultaneously deconstructive and constructive.
This is a task that implies no model. It can be taken up by 
feminists everywhere. We are by now familiar with third world feminist 
critiques of the ways discourses of tradition create the victimized and 
disempowered “third world woman” as their object, and the way such 
constructions allow fi rst world feminists to speak in the name of all women 
and to claim the position of universal female subjectivity (see Lazreg, 
“Triumphant,” Narayan, and Abu-Lughod). While such positioning still 
happens all too often, there are also signs of change. To give an example, 
Maj Britt Theorin, chairwoman of the European Parliament’s Committee 
on Women’s Right and Equal Opportunity, criticized what she calls inac-
tion on the part of the European Commission on the issue of honor crimes. 
In 2001, she noted that to continue membership negotiations without 
urging the Turkish state to take all necessary measures is in effect being 
complicit with the perpetrators. Also signifi cant is that she does not give 
in to easy explanations of honor crimes by appeals to tradition. Instead, 
she highlights the role of institutions, those of the European Union as well 
as those of the Turkish state:
The [European] Commission has promised to raise the issue, 
but so far the results have not been seen. This inaction by the 
Commission is inexcusable, as Turkish police and judges still 
overlook these crimes, seldom prosecute offenders, and when 
judges do fi nd a guilty verdict, they only give these murderers 
a few years in prison [. . .] [W]e cannot hold our heads up and 
move forward with Turkish membership until there are concrete 
results.30
Theorin takes this stance not only as a feminist but also as an active 
participant in institutional policy-making. Such positions taken by femi-
nists situated both inside and outside institutions are crucial to the criti-
cal evaluation of institutional discourses and policies on honor crimes. 
Exploring the complicit roles of international organizations such as the 
European Union, the imf, the World Bank, and the United Nations, as well 
as their national counterparts, can ultimately lead to the modifi cation of 
those roles.
To address the problem of honor crimes and the tradition effect, 
it does not matter what one’s personal attitude is toward “tradition.” Some 
feminists may want to defi ne and hold on to a social realm understood as 
“tradition,” while others may want to do away with it entirely. What mat-
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ters in the struggle against the tradition effect is not a focus on tradition 
per se, its importance, or the question of who is licensed to speak about 
it, but an analytical shift to focus on institutions and their framing opera-
tions. In other words, to tackle the tradition effect, feminists around the 
world do not need to agree on what “tradition” is or who is authorized to 
speak about it. All they need to do is to look closely at institutional policies, 
especially when those policies imagine that they themselves are contesting 
tradition. Yet, the future of such efforts remains seriously bound up with 
the way the tradition effect unfolds in various fi elds. Those feminists who 
see themselves as supporting “women in non-Western locations in the grip 
of traditions” may fi nd it diffi cult to complicate the picture so as to ask 
what other structures implicate these women. Those who work in and who 
claim the very discursive space that the tradition effect opens may fi nd the 
shift to an institutional analysis diffi cult, with muddier politics and a less 
comfortable position from which to speak as a singular subject. To what 
extent feminists around the globe will try to understand the institutional 
dynamics that reproduce honor crimes is an open question. What is clear, 
however, is that without such efforts to read between the lines of institu-
tional discourses and work for institutional change, the tradition effect 
is bound to continue to do its work. Given the stakes, it may very well be 
the time for feminists everywhere to grapple with the burden of the next 
honor crime, the next “death by tradition.”
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1 The term “honor crime” is itself 
debated in feminist circles. Other 
terms such as “the crime of kill-
ing women for family honor” have 
been suggested, as they highlight 
the violence of the phenomenon. 
As my focus in this paper is on 
the various ways in which the 
phenomenon is framed, I prefer 
the most widely used term “honor 
crime.”
2 “Islam” posited in the singular 
is often implicitly and at times 
explicitly cast as the root cause 
of these “problematic traditions.” 
What is interesting about such an 
assumption is that the singular 
Islam is rarely placed in rela-
tion to national and international 
institutional structures. For a 
careful comparative analysis of 
the state and legal structures 
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of Muslim countries in terms 
of domestic violence, see Haj-
jar. She concludes that there are 
important differences in the legal 
handling of domestic violence, 
contrary to expectations about the 
singular “culture of Islam.” The 
existence and effectivity of wom-
en’s recourse in cases of domestic 
violence seem to depend on the 
legal arrangements undertaken 
in the name of Sharia (Islamic 
Law) in relation to the particular 
history of the country in question.
3 See Abusharaf, who shows how 
women involved in such “objec-
tively” problematic practices as 
female genital mutilation can 
attach a multiplicity of meanings 
to them. These meanings, she 
convincingly argues, are simulta-
neously cultural and subjective. 
Her discussion is a good correc-
tive to strictly behaviorist catego-
rizations of so-called traditional 
practices, pointing to the need to 
develop more sophisticated analy-
ses of these so-called traditional 
practices in order to understand 
their implications in terms of 
women’s empowerment.
4 Sati is different from these 
other practices in that the 
debates around it have taken 
place mainly in the nineteenth 
century. Nevertheless, it remains 
a point of discussion in the 
current debates. See Daly. 
For a critique of Daly’s framing, 
see Narayan. See also Mani.
5 Clearly, this critique is not pro-
duced only by third world femi-
nists. See Volpp, “Feminism,” 
for an informed critical debate 
on these issues with a focus on 
their impact in legal develop-
ments in the u.s. See also her 
“(Mis)Identifying” for a discus-
sion of the informal lawyerly 
practice of cultural defense in 
the u.s. legal system. Moreover, 
the term “third world feminist” is 
itself highly contested (Narayan). 
In this paper I use the term to 
refer to all feminists who write 
on gender issues and who empha-
size that being situated in a third 
world location is a signifi cant fac-
tor that defi es facile generaliza-
tions about such universals 
as “women” or “feminists.”
6 Except for a brief section in the 
discussion on the European 
Union, I do not engage with ques-
tions regarding the effects of mar-
ket structures in this paper. This 
is by no means to downplay the 
importance of markets in terms 
of the ways they impact social and 
cultural contexts and so-called 
traditions in ways that impede 
women’s empowerment.
7 See Shalhoub-Kevorkian for a 
discussion of the ways in which 
Palestinian state structures are 
complicit in the making of honor 
crimes. While her discussion is 
illuminating in highlighting this 
point, I fi nd notions like “conspir-
acy of femicide” too monolithic 
to adequately elucidate the ten-
sions in the reproduction of honor 
crimes.
 While not directly on 
honor crimes or on feminism 
per se, the self-refl exive turn in 
anthropological scholarship has 
been important in opening the 
analytical space I pursue here. 
See Marcus and Fisher for an 
example. Also see Chanock for 
an analysis that combines the 
critical insights of anthropol-
ogy with those of history. His 
discussion of the Central African 
context is illuminating in that he 
shows how “tradition” or “cus-
tom,” even when being codifi ed as 
customary Law, was constituted 
by political contestations of the 
time. On the invention and polic-
ing of “custom,” also see Dirks.
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8 In some especially liberal femi-
nist circles, debates continue 
as if third world feminist criti-
cisms had never been made. For a 
relatively recent argument along 
these lines, see Okin, “Is Mul-
ticulturalism Bad for Women?” 
In this essay, she fi rst declares 
culture(s) the cause of women’s 
repression and gender inequal-
ity. She then conveniently couples 
this defi nition of culture with 
her version of multiculturalism. 
Neither in her defi nition of cul-
ture nor in her defi nition of mul-
ticulturalism does there remain 
enough analytical space for a 
discussion of the structures of 
power that implicate women.
9 The Turkish term for honor 
crimes is “namus cinayetleri,” 
alternately called “namus 
suclari.” The Turkish term for 
“murders of tradition” is “tore 
cinayetleri.”
10 Mitchell’s discussion of what he 
calls the “state effect” is a source 
of inspiration here. He notes that 
the political domain always com-
prises complex relations between 
what are deemed state and non-
state actors. The drawing of the 
line between state and society 
enables certain areas and certain 
actions to be defi ned as nonstate, 
even though those areas continue 
to be formed in relation to the 
actions of state actors. This in 
effect allows for a reassignment of 
positions and relations of power 
as a matter of a perceivedly objec-
tive distinction between the state 
and its exterior, yielding a vision 
of nonstate actors as nonpolitical.
11 Here I use the term juridical 
convention in dialogue with 
Cover’s discussion of legal 
tradition and normative universe. 
Cover explores the normative 
universe within which legal 
texts come to be interpreted:
  A legal tradition 
is part and parcel of a complex 
normative world. The tradi-
tion includes not only a corpus 
juris but also a language and a 
mythos—narratives in which the 
corpus juris is located by those 
whose wills act upon it. [. . .] These 
myths establish a repertoire of 
moves—a lexicon of normative 
action—that may be combined 
into meaningful patterns culled 
from the meaningful patterns of 
the past. The normative meaning 
that has inhered in the patterns of 
the past will be found in the his-
tory of ordinary legal doctrine at 
work in mundane affairs, [. . .] in 
apologies for power and privilege 
and in the critiques that may be 
leveled at the justifi catory enter-
prises of the law. (101)
12 These interviews were conducted 
as part of a research project that 
looked at questions of citizenship 
and the everyday reproduction of 
inequalities in the legal realm. 
While doing this fi eldwork, I 
observed women’s concerns as 
they live with honor—even when 
they do not die for it—and real-
ized the prevalence of the notion.
13 Family honor is mentioned only 
in Articles 151 and 152, which are 
about the annulment of marriage 
due to the misrepresentation of 
one of the parties about 
his or her honor.
14 In the past, state institutions such 
as orphanages or the political 
bureau of the police department 
requested these exams, which 
resulted on at least one occasion 
with the suicides of two orphan 
girls. In 1992 a high-school head-
master ordered four girls to take 
virginity tests. Two of them com-
mitted suicide. In 1998 fi ve girls 
from a state-run orphanage, 
aged twelve to sixteen, attempted 
suicide in order to avoid being 
forced to submit to the test. The 
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examination was later forced 
upon them in their hospital beds. 
Following these and other similar 
incidents, a ban was passed on 
forced virginity exams. This ban 
remains highly contested, how-
ever, and only covers those cases 
where explicit pressure can be 
shown. See Human Rights Watch, 
“A Matter of Power.”
15 See the Human Rights Watch 
Global Report, 1995.
16 Clearly, even then, this was an 
idealized and essentialized notion 
of a temporally static Western 
Europe and North America.
17 Turkish feminists have only 
recently started questioning 
Republican representations of 
Ottoman women as ultimately 
powerless. Cakir’s work, despite 
its methodological problems, 
came somewhat as a revelation as 
it was the fi rst exploration of the 
Muslim women’s movement in the 
Empire. A second revelation that 
goes beyond the ethnocentric pre-
sumptions of most feminists who 
happen to be part of the Turkish 
and Sunnite Muslim majority has 
been the “discovery” of the wom-
en’s movements of other ethnic 
and religious minorities. See Bilal 
et al. for an examination of the 
Armenian Women’s Movement in 
the Ottoman Empire.
18 In Umraniye, a municipality of 
Istanbul with half a million resi-
dents, forty-one percent of women 
state that they need the permis-
sion of some family member to 
leave the house alone during the 
day. To go out in the evenings, 
this proportion increases to 96.2 
percent (Ilkkaracan and Ilk-
karacan). Concerns for “family 
honor” have been shown to legiti-
mize these limitations. (This is 
a violation of the right to travel 
according not only to human 
rights norms but also according 
to Article 23 of the Turkish Con-
stitution.)
19 This article, which is currently 
part of the criminal code, was 
supplemented by a decree during 
the term of a female Minister of 
Justice (Ms. Aysel Celikel) that 
required the judge to conduct 
an inquiry to learn whether or 
not the woman was willing to 
marry. In the proposed revision, 
this legal arrangement is to be 
revoked.
20 The Republican People’s Party 
(rpp) is currently the only oppo-
sition party in the government. 
It is the oldest party and claims 
continuity with the nationalist 
statist tradition initiated by the 
national leader Mustafa Kemal 
(1881–1938). The party’s pro-
gram includes working to realize 
the terms of the Convention of 
the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination, yet most of the 
program is devoted to women’s 
equality in the work place and 
to women’s education. Clearly, 
these objectives are in line with 
the nationalist agenda of pushing 
women into the public sphere. 
However, there is not much 
mention of challenging intrafa-
milial structures or defending 
women’s bodily integrity. Out of 
ten concerns identifi ed, only one 
is devoted to violence against 
women. Moreover, there is no 
specifi c mention of honor crimes. 
In general, then, the program of 
the rpp and its general approach 
to issues of honor crimes seem to 
follow the national statist ideol-
ogy that dominates the institu-
tional structure I described in the 
section on Law and Other State 
Institutions.
21 These criteria are generally 
called the Copenhagen Criteria 
after the 1993 meeting.
22 The importance of the e.u. can 
be understood better when com-
pared with the impact of other 
international bodies such as the 
United Nations or the Council 
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of Europe. While these bodies 
produce annual reports that 
stress the importance of civil 
and political rights and freedoms 
and examine related problems 
in Turkey, their impact on the 
creation of substantive policies 
has seldom passed beyond lip 
service in the last two decades.
23 See the Human Rights Agenda 
for the Next Phase of Turkey’s 
Accession Process, 2003.
24 There was, however, a resolu-
tion passed by the Council of 
Europe, Parliamentary Assembly 
(Resolution 1327, adopted 4 Apr. 
2003). The Council of Europe is 
often confused with the Council 
of European Union—formerly 
known as the Council of Min-
isters. The Council of Europe, 
established in the aftermath of 
the Second World War, exists 
independently of the e.u. Cur-
rently it has forty-fi ve member 
states, including all the e.u. coun-
tries. The 2003 resolution attends 
quite effectively to the specifi ci-
ties of the cases and to the mul-
tiplicity of ways in which states 
may take part in the social repro-
duction of honor crimes. However, 
it is much less effective than a 
comparable resolution taken by 
the European Parliament, as the 
former is an intergovernmental 
organization working mainly in 
an advisory capacity while the 
latter has more political power.
25 For instance, one report raises the 
issue in the context of facilitating 
Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. 
See “e.u. Policy towards Mediter-
ranean Countries in Relation to 
the Promotion of Women’s Rights 
and Equal Opportunities in These 
Countries” (23 Jan. 2002).
26 “Report on Incorporating Equal 
Opportunities for Women and 
Men into All Community Policies 
and Activities” (21 Feb. 1996) com 
(96)0067.
27 For a discussion of representa-
tions of Turkish migrants in 
Germany in media other than 
the news, see Yalcin-Heckmann. 
Here, the author argues that 
patterns of objectifi cation in the 
case of Turkish migrants are 
changing as they increasingly 
become active participants in 
the production process of German 
media.
28 Turkish media portray the crimes 
in a manner parallel to interna-
tional media. The comments of 
the Turkish journalist/researcher 
Mehmet Farac in the Washington 
Post article exemplify this. In his 
own book, Farac does note the 
role of poverty and the problems 
of the electoral regime in repro-
ducing honor crimes. Yet, despite 
such comments, the framework 
of his book is constructed around 
the blaming of tradition, evident 
in the name of the book: Woman 
in the Grip of Tradition. More-
over, Farac frames the issue as 
primarily contained in the south-
eastern region.
29 The Justice and Development 
Party may seem to be an excep-
tion in that it appropriates 
tradition as part of its identity. 
However, that appropriation is 
selective. While endorsing some 
of what it considers traditional 
family honor, it externalizes other 
traditions, such as honor crimes. 
This very act of making a choice 
is enabled by the perception that 
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